Did I Dance on the Tables? Did I Shoot Out the Lights? European Electricity Policy As a Guide to America\u27s Energy Future by Kimbrough, Todd
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 4 
Issue 3 Centennial Universal Congress of Lawyers Conference—Lawyers & Jurists in the 21st 
Century 
January 2005 
Did I Dance on the Tables? Did I Shoot Out the Lights? European 
Electricity Policy As a Guide to America's Energy Future 
Todd Kimbrough 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Energy and Utilities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Todd Kimbrough, Did I Dance on the Tables? Did I Shoot Out the Lights? European Electricity Policy As a 
Guide to America's Energy Future, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 675 (2005), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/15 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
675 
 
 
DID I DANCE ON THE TABLES? DID I SHOOT 
OUT THE LIGHTS? EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY 
POLICY AS A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S  
ENERGY FUTURE 
Europe already has experienced many of the same growing pains in its 
electricity industry that the United States is beginning to encounter today. 
Both the European and the American utility markets were heavily 
regulated until recently; however, Europe began to restructure its 
electricity industry before any of the American states.1 There are 
remarkable similarities between the policies implemented in Europe and 
those promoted by the Bush Administration,2 including, the 
interconnection of once independent utilities.3 Additionally, there are 
commonalities between European market restructuring legislation4 and 
efforts to deregulate in the United States.5 The United States6 should learn 
 1. In 1990, England and Wales became the first European nations to deregulate their electric 
utilities. See DEP’T OF ENERGY: ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRICITY REFORM ABROAD AND U.S. 
INVESTMENT 17 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter EIA REPORT], available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
pgem/electric/061697.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2005). California began to deregulate its electric 
utilities in 1996. A.B. 1890 § 854, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, codified, in relevant part, at CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
CODE §§ 330–398.5 (Deering 2003) [hereinafter CA’s deregulation statue]. 
 2. See, e.g., Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access Transmission Service and 
Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,451 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter SMD NPRM]. This proposed rule has not been finalized, but many of the 
issues discussed in it overlap with elements of the Energy Bill currently before Congress. Id. 
 3. See Common Position No. 5/2003, 2003 O.J. (C50) 15; Council Directive 96/92 1997 O.J. 
(L027) 20. 
 4. Compare The Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29 (Eng.), and Energy Act of 1990 (Norway). See also 
Sverre Aam & Ivar Wangensteen, Deregulation of the Norwegian Electricity Supply Industry: 
Expectations and Experiences, available at http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/publications/ 
default/tech_papers/17th_congress/1_4_04.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2005). 
 5. Pat Wood, III, Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Testimony before 
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/ 
press-room/ct-archives/2003/09-03-03-wood.pdf [hereinafter Wood 9/3/03 testimony] (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2005). “The grid was built originally to interconnect neighboring utilities and to allow them 
to share resources when necessary but is now used as a ‘superhighway’ for broader, regional trading.” 
Reliability was primarily the responsibility of the vertically integrated local utility. Depending on state 
law, utilities may be accountable to state utility commissions or other local regulators for reliable 
service. Id. 
 6. For this paper, the United States includes the continental United States, excluding Texas. The 
engineering of the United States electricity grid is such that Texas is independent of the rest of the 
continental United States. As a result, unlike other states, the Public Utility Commission of Texas 
oversees transmission in Texas. See 2003 PUB. UTIL. COMM. OF TEX, SCOPE OF COMPETITION IN 
ELECTRIC MARKETS IN TEXAS 18 (2003), available at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/electric/reports/scope 
/2003/2003scope_elec.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2005). See also SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶ 23. 
Therefore, it is not subject to federal regulation because it fails to constitute interstate commerce. See 
generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
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from the successes and the failures of Europe. Given the high priority 
placed on energy issues since the August 14, 2003, blackout,7 lessons 
gleaned from the European experience can be valuable in reshaping the 
antiquated American electricity system.  
This Note examines the European Union’s goal of homogenization of 
electricity markets and European market restructuring methods over the 
past fifteen years, to design a coherent and efficient method of creating a 
national electricity policy in the United States. Part I focuses on the 
European policies of homogenization8 and seamless electricity markets as 
an analogy to the Standard Market Design (SMD) advocated by the Bush 
Administration.9 Part II compares the restructuring legislation and 
regulations of England and Norway to those in California10 and 
Pennsylvania11 to find new ideas for American restructuring. Europe has 
 7. See Jeff Nesmith, Power Grid Needs Update, Panelists Told; Norwood Slams Plan Being 
Touted, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 4, 2003, at 7A. The House of Representatives 
Committee on Energy and Commerce began hearings immediately upon beginning of the fall 
Congressional term. Id. Bruce Humphrey, Mixed Signals Cloud Reliability Picture, PLATT’S ENERGY 
& BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY 49 (2002) (noting failures in electric service cost the American economy 
about $100 billion per year). Pat Wood, 9/3/03 testimony, supra note 5, § IV (finding that “electrical 
problems that start in one state (or country) can profoundly affect people elsewhere. Preventing region-
wide disruptions of electrical service requires regional coordination and planning, as to both the 
system’s day-to-day operation and its longer-term infrastructure needs.”). Additionally, computers and 
the Internet account for fifteen percent of America’s electricity consumption today, and it has been 
forecasted that this number could reach fifty percent. See NYISO 2000: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW 
YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR, INC. 15 (2001), available at http://www.nyiso.com. Utilities 
constitute five percent of the European Gross Domestic Product. See Coen & Doyle, infra note 14, at 
22. 
 8. There have been some instances where homogeneity has occurred. For example, product 
liability laws regarding electricity are nearly identical Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, and 
Luxembourg. See Belgium: Law Regarding Liability For Defective Products, Feb. 25, 1991, 32 INT’L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 1357 (1993); Denmark: Products Liability Act, June 7, 1989, 32 INT’L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1363 (1993); Germany: Law Concerning Liability For Defective Products, Dec. 15, 1989, 
32 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1369 (1993); Greece: Ministerial Decision on Producer’s Responsibility 
Concerning Defective Products, Mar. 31, 1988, 32 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1376 (1993); Italy: 
Presidential Decree on Liability For Defective Products, May 24, 1988, 32 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 
1382 (1993); Luxembourg: Law Concerning Public Liability Due to Defective Products, Mar. 9, 1989, 
32 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1390 (1993). 
 9. See Inquiries into Blackout Expected to Bring Close Scrutiny to RTO Policy, FERC’s Role, 
PLATT’S GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Aug. 28, 2003, at 1. “FERC Chairman Pat Wood said . . . that the 
standard market design plan is the best way to install thoughtful long-term solutions to transmission 
problems.” Id. 
 10. The rationale for choosing to focus on California is rather obvious. In addition to being the 
first American state to deregulate its electricity markets, its failure has received worldwide attention. 
See Thomas A. Fogarty & Edward Iwata, Energy Deregulation: Is it Friend or Enemy?, USA TODAY, 
May 15, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/covers/2002-05-16-enron-california-
hearings.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2005). 
 11. Pennsylvania is an especially interesting state for study because one of the current FERC 
Commissioners was a Commissioner at the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission before accepting 
a federal appointment. See Biography of Commissioner Nora Mead Brownell, at http://www.ferc.gov/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/15
p675 Kimbrough book pages.doc 11/8/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY POLICY A GUIDE TO AMERICA 677 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tried to create a seamless market, but encountered problems. Both 
American and European markets would benefit greatly from market 
homogenization and the removal of barriers to markets. As America 
creates a more seamless market, it can learn from the deregulation of 
markets both domestic and abroad. This Note proposes that the United 
States and Europe unify their respective markets and open their wholesale 
electricity markets to greater competition. 
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ENERGY DIRECTIVE AND THE FEDERAL 
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION’S SINGLE MARKET DESIGN, SEEK TO 
ACHIEVE THE SAME GOALS 
One of the most notable similarities between the European model and 
the likely future of the American industry lies in the interconnection of 
utilities to create large multinational (or in the United States, multi-state) 
trading blocks. Historically, utilities in Europe acted as islands within each 
nation.12 They were also typically state-owned,13 so the level of regulation 
was high.14 Similarly, the American system established exclusive franchise 
territories for utilities, which the government regulated heavily.15 Since 
1996,16 the European Union (EU) has required the interconnection of 
about/com-mem/brownell.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2005). 
 12. See Jens T. Werner, U.S. Telecommunication Companies in Europe—The Application of E.C. 
Competition Law in the Telecommunications Sector, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 409, 411 (2002). This 
was the case for other infrastructure intensive industries as well. Now, there is a trend for these 
industries, including electricity, to move toward more competitive systems. Id.  
 13. See Regulatory Reform in Norway: The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform, 
OECD, 2003, at 29 [hereinafter OECD]. The Norwegian transmission and distribution system 
(Statnett) remains owned by the government as does the nation’s largest energy supplier (Statkraft). Id. 
In spite of the fact that Statnett and Statkraft ownership overlaps, there have been no indications of 
impropriety or collusion. This is probably, at least in part, due to the strict oversight by regulators. See 
Glachant & Finon, infra note 18, at 6.  
 14. See generally David Coen & Chris Doyle, Liberalisation of Utilities and Evolving European 
Regulation, EUR. REG., Apr. 2000, at 18, available at http://www.cdoyle.com/papers/utilitiescoen.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2005). 
 15. Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 155, 157–58 (2001). See M. Bruce Harper, Trust But Verify: Innovation in Compliance 
Monitoring as a Response to the Privatization of Utilities in Developed Nations, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 
593, 599–605 (1996) (describing the belief that because electricity is critical to a nation’s economic 
health it should be regulated and monitored by the government to protect against potential market 
flaws). The United States also has many government-owned utilities. Most of them are municipally 
owned, but there are also federally owned generators as a result of rural electrification polices and 
New Deal jobs programs. Id. See also 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1933); 16 U.S.C. § 832 (1937); 6 TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN. § 222 (1934) (creating the Tennessee Valley Authority, Bonneville Power Authority, and 
Lower Colorado River Authority respectively). 
 16. See Rachel A. Mitchell, The Electricity Directive of the European Union: What can the 
Member States Learn from the Experiences of Privatized England and Wales?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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electricity grids, which is consistent with its overarching goal of unfettered 
international trade among its members.17 However, implementation has 
been slow.18 The first Directive permitted nations to phase-in liberalization 
at a pace that they deemed appropriate, and there was no definitive date for 
the complete liberalization of all the EU markets.19 In June 2003, the EU 
passed a new directive, Directive 2003/54/EC (the “new Directive”),20 
which repealed its predecessor, Directive 96/92/EC (the “old Directive”).21 
The new Directive affirms the EU’s desire for an integrated utility market 
and recognizes the shortcomings of the old Directive.22 But, given its 
recent enactment, it is uncertain how much the new Directive will affect 
the European markets. 
A. Unifying the European Electricity Market 
The European Union’s Common Position No. 5/200323 explains that 
the EU believes that its electricity markets can benefit from intra-Union 
free trade, just as its other industries. “The main obstacles in arriving at a 
fully operational and competitive internal market relate amongst other 
things to issues of access to the network, tarification issues and different 
degrees of market opening between Member States.”24 Open access and 
successful markets benefit from homogenous rules and market structures.25
But the EU’s old Directive provided many exemptions for small 
utilities and gave Member States the discretion to impact the reach of the 
overarching policies on their nations.26 Consequently, the goals of 
REV. 761, 775–76 (1999). Before 1996, there were indications that a single European electricity 
market would be established. The Council to the European Parliament made its initial proposal that set 
forth common rules for a single electricity market in 1992. Id. 
 17. See Council Directive 96/92/EC, supra note 3. 
 18. See generally Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon, Why Do the European Union’s 
Electricity Industries Continue to Differ? A New Institutional Analysis, in Institutions, Contracts & 
Organizations 313 (Claude Menard ed., 2000).  
 19. See Michael Albers, European Union Law: Energy Liberalization and EC Competition Law, 
25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 909, 913 (2002). 
 20. Council Directive 2003/54/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 37. 
 21. See supra note 3.
 22. See supra note 20, ¶ 5. Additionally, Directive 2003/54/EC includes completion deadlines 
unlike the old Directive. Id. art. 30. 
 23. Common Position No. 5/2003, 2003 O.J. This Position is the successor to Council Directive 
96/92/EC which initiated the EU’s model of large-scale interconnection to promote intra-Union trade 
of electricity. Id. 
 24. Common Position No. 5/2003, supra note 23, ¶ 5. 
 25. Common Position No. 5/2003, supra note 23, ¶ 14. “[N]ational regulatory authorities should 
work towards more homogenous conditions and the whole of the internal market.” Id. There have been 
some instances where homogeneity has occurred. See supra note 8. 
 26. See, e.g., Common Position No. 5/2003, supra note 23, ¶ 11. “To avoid imposing a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/15
p675 Kimbrough book pages.doc 11/8/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY POLICY A GUIDE TO AMERICA 679 
 
 
 
 
 
 
homogeneity and seamless borders were not absolute. Rather, regional 
interests can ignore Union-wide goals.27 European countries lack similar 
electric industry institutional arrangements or institutional environments in 
reforming electricity, it will be difficult for them to converge toward the 
same model of electricity-system reform.28 Many suggest that current 
European attempts to introduce competition have not succeeded in 
overcoming transactional difficulties, namely, the inability to store 
electricity and the geographic problems associated with inadequate 
interconnections. These geographic elements of interconnection are 
essential for competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets.29 
However, concerns that electricity policy coordination will lead Member 
States down the slippery slope—forfeiting national sovereignty—have 
slowed integration significantly.30  
Additionally, logistical limitations have hampered the liberalization 
process. Especially in the early years of intra-Union competition, 
policymakers assumed that competition would come from the import of 
electricity from neighboring Member States.31 Investment in new power 
plants in neighboring Member States would come later.32 However, the 
infrastructure to haul the electricity from one nation to another has proven 
grossly inadequate, thereby impairing imports of competitive electricity.33
In the summer of 2003, the EU passed a successor to Directive 
96/92/EC called Directive 2003/54/EC. Directive 2003/54/EC (the “new 
Directive”) takes steps very similar to those advocated in the Chairman of 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Pat Wood’s, SMD 
disproportionate financial and administrative burden on small distribution companies, Member States 
should be able, where necessary, to exempt such companies from the legal distribution requirements.” 
Id. National regulators can approve tariffs and their underlying methodologies. Id. ¶ 17. 
 27. See Mitchell, supra note 16, at 785. Council Directive 96/92/EC lacks its own enforcement 
provisions and, instead, attempts to use the enforcement provisions of other treaties, i.e., treaties 
regarding anticompetitive behavior. 
 28. Glachant & Finon, supra note 18. 
 29. Id. at 3–4. 
 30. See Mitchell, supra note 16, at 767.  
 31. Albers, supra note 19, at 919. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, European, Energy Infrastructure: 
Green Paper on the implementation of the guidelines for Trans-European Energy Networks in the 
period 1996–2001,COM (2001) 775 Final (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.seerecon.org 
/infrastructure/sectors/energy/documents/energy-infrastructure/2001_communication.pdf [hereinafter 
Green Paper]. The interconnection between France and Spain can handle only two percent of the 
installed electric capacity of the Iberian Peninsula and is nearly always congested. Id. at 7; see also 
PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC 
UTILITY DEREGULATION 63 (1983) (noting the practice of ignoring the critical functions played by the 
transmission system in many discussions of deregulation almost certainly leads to incorrect 
conclusions about the optimal structure of an electric power system). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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proposal34 in America’s pending Energy Bill. And perhaps most important 
to market success, the new Directive provides clear deadlines for the 
completion of market liberalization.35
But even the new Directive retains the opt-out clauses for Member 
States that consider utilities in their markets too small to join the Union-
wide system. The EU does not make these decisions, but the local 
governments that may or may not have interests in the utility can shape the 
Union-wide market. This could produce a European market full of gaps. 
Occupying these gaps are old school monopolies where competition does 
not exist. Additionally, if the Member State has an ownership interest in a 
monopoly utility in its country, then it may have an incentive to block the 
free trade of electricity.36 Finally, it adds to uncertainty as to whether 
certain regions will ever be integrated at all. This added risk could thwart 
investment in those regions.37  
The new Directive emphasizes cooperation and coordination among the 
national regulators of each country, rather than implementing a Union-
wide mandate for uniformity.38 This maintains policies similar to those of 
the old Directive39 and suggests an unwillingness of Member States to 
transfer power to the EU.40
 34. See Directive 2003/54/EC, supra note 20, ¶ 2. “Experience in implementing this Directive 
shows the benefits that may result from the internal market in electricity, in terms of efficiency gains, 
price reductions, higher standards of service and increased competitiveness.” Id. But see Wood 5/15/02 
Testimony, infra note 42 (noting “SMD will help enhance competition in wholesale electric markets 
and broaden the benefits and cost savings to all customers”). 
 35. Directive 2003/54 supra note 20, art. 30 §§ 1, 2. Section 1 requires implementation of the 
Directive to be complete by July 1, 2004. Section 2 requires the functional unbundling of transmission 
and distribution sections of utilities from the generation and other sections of the utility by July 1, 
2007. Id. 
 36. See Coen & Doyle, supra note 14, at 24. It is important to note that the European Union does 
not have an agency comparable to FERC. Electricity regulation occurs at the national level and/or 
through the EU Directive process, but there is not a common regulatory body. Id.  
 37. See ROGER A. MORIN, REGULATORY FINANCE: UTILITIES’ COST OF CAPITAL 270 (1994). 
Higher risk requires higher returns in order for investors to find the investment rational. Id. See 
generally JEFF MADURA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (2003). 
 38. Directive 2003/54 supra note 20, ¶ 16. 
 39. See Directive 96/92 supra note 3, ¶ 1. 
 40. See Directive 2003/54, supra note 20; EU Common Position 5/2003; supra note 3; Directive 
96/92/EC; SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶ 9. “The fundamental goal of the Standard Market Design 
requirements, in conjunction with the standardized transmission service, is to create ‘seamless’ 
wholesale power markets that allow sellers to transact easily across transmission grid boundaries and 
that allow customers to receive the benefits of lower-cost and more reliable electric supply.” Id. In 
addition to mirroring the general philosophy of competition, the SMD NPRM also includes an out 
clause for small utilities. However, unlike the EU model where the decision to grant waiver rests with 
local officials, the SMD NPRM would require waiver from FERC itself. Id. ¶ 115. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/15
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B. Current Efforts at American Single Market Design 
American policymakers are confronting the issue of national 
interconnection.41 America’s Standard Market Design42 (SMD) mirrors the 
general philosophy of unfettered free trade through homogenous rules 
found in the new Directive,43 the EU Common Position 5/2003, and in 
their predecessor Directive 96/92.44 However, pegging what SMD in the 
United States would actually include, has proven difficult. Whereas FERC 
once advocated a strong national policy,45 it seems that they have 
acquiesced to those seeking to retain more localized control.46
 41. See generally SMD NPRM, supra note 2. The SMD NPRM came to an impasse in early 
2003. Several utilities and a few state utility commissions vociferously opposed SMD. This opposition 
squelched efforts to finalize this rule, and it still has not been finalized. But since the August 14 
Blackout, there has been a resurgence of interest in SMD. In fact, FERC Chairman Wood suggests that 
SMD will aid efforts to improve reliability. See Inquiries into Blackout Expected to Bring Close 
Scrutiny to RTO Policy, FERC’s Role, PLATT’S GLOBAL POWER REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. “FERC 
Chairman Pat Wood said . . . that the standard market design plan is the best way to install thoughtful 
long-term solutions to transmission problems.” Id. See also Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by 
Stranded Costs Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 
385) (noting that preceding the SMD NPRM, Independent System Operators (ISOs) began to appear in 
response to FERC’s Order No. 888, but the regulation of them included each of the relevant states’ 
regulatory agencies as well as FERC. ISOs are private, non-profit enterprises that coordinate the 
scheduling of electricity flows within a region). See Gerald Norlander, May the FERC Rely-on 
Markets to Set Electric Rates?, 24 ENERGY L.J. 65, 67 (2003). After the development of ISOs, FERC 
called for the creation of Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs). RTOs are larger, more 
sophisticated organizations than ISOs. Membership in RTOs was encouraged but not required and the 
major goal was the interconnection of larger markets than those established in ISOs. See SMD NPRM, 
supra note 2, ¶¶ 24–29.  
 42. See, e.g., Pat Wood, III, Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Testimony 
before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, 
Foreign Commerce and Tourism (May 15, 2002) at 15, available at http://commerce.senate.gov/ 
hearings/051502wood.pdf [hereinafter Wood 5/15/02 testimony]. See also Wood Ready to Defend 
SMD Rulemaking in Court Against State Challenge, PLATT’S POWER MARKETS WEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, 
at 5 (noting one state utility commissioner described SMD as a “massive takeover” of state power). 
See Wood 9/3/03 testimony, supra note 5. “The grid was built originally to interconnect neighboring 
utilities and to allow them to share resources when necessary but is now used as a ‘superhighway’ for 
broader, regional trading.” Id. Reliability was primarily the responsibility of the vertically integrated 
local utility. Depending on state law, utilities may be accountable to state utility commissions or other 
local regulators for reliable service. Id. 
 43. See generally Directive 2003/54, supra note 1. “The fundamental goal of the Standard 
Market Design requirements, in conjunction with the standardized transmission service, is to create 
‘seamless’ wholesale power markets that allow sellers to transact easily across transmission grid 
boundaries and that allow customers to receive the benefits of lower-cost and more reliable electric 
supply.” Id. 
 44. See generally Directive 96/92, supra note 3. 
 45. See SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6, 9. 
 46. See Press Release, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, Chairman Wood Outlines FERC Plans for 
2003, SMD White Paper Planned, available at http://www.wpuda.org/PDF_files/FERC01-13-03.pdf 
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Congress and FERC already have established requirements for regional 
coordination.47 This began when Congress passed the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992.48 FERC’s implementation of the Energy Policy Act led to the 
creation of Independent System Operators (ISOs), and later FERC 
initiatives promoted the creation of larger coordination bodies dubbed 
Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs).49 But the size and strength of 
regional organizations continued to grow.50 Now, SMD suggests the 
creation of a very limited number of organizations for the entire 
continental U.S.51  
FERC introduced the SMD idea in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) in 2002.52 The NPRM proposes the creation of a single pro forma 
tariff that would proscribe rules for the continental U.S.53 and create six 
different price zones that would use the tariff rules.54 Moreover, the 
(suggesting that he would endorse a plan with regional flexibility and that led to staggered 
implementation of homogenization). But see SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶¶ 335–39 (proposing 
regional stakeholder groups to advise federal policymakers on issues that might be unique to a specific 
part of the nation).  
 47. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2000). “The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all facilities 
for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used 
for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution . . . “ Id. See, e.g., 
Umatilla Electric Cooperative Assoc., 97 FERC ¶ 61,235 (2001) (utilizing the option for quasi-
governmental and cooperative utilities to enter the competitive market by creating an acceptable 
reciprocity tariff). But see Emerald Util. Dist. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 100 FERC ¶ 61,138 
(2002). This system is not absolute. For example, quasi-governmental utilities such as Bonneville 
Power Authority and the Tennessee Valley Authority do not have to join ISOs or RTOs. Id. 
 48. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776. 
 49. See generally Regional Transmission Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,389 (May 13, 1999) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). The Commission’s objective was “for all transmission owning entities in 
the Nation, including non-public utility entities, to place their transmission facilities under the control 
of appropriate regional transmission institutions [RTOs] in a timely manner.” Id. See also SMD 
NPRM, supra note 2, ¶ 26. FERC has noted that willingness by utilities to join RTOs is a function of 
certainty about regulatory requirements associated with RTO membership. Id. 
 50. See F.E.R.C. Docket No. EL02-65-000, Implementation Progress Report, filed Oct. 1, 2003. 
There has been some interest by the industry in merging RTOs so that a single RTO would coordinate 
activity and market transactions for huge geographic areas. For example, the Midwest Independent 
System Operator (MISO) and the PJM RTO are currently seeking to merge their markets. MISO is 
now working with PJM to create a robust, non-discriminatory single energy market covering their 
collective regions. Id. But see SeTrans Fallen Apart, Southeast Grid Picture Clouds Up and Entergy 
Mulls Its Next Steps, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Dec. 8, 2003, at 1 (noting that “the Southeastern 
utilities seeking to create the SeTrans regional transmission organization pulled the plug on the project 
last week, explaining that jurisdictional battles between state and federal regulators would be too hard 
to overcome to make the process worthwhile”). 
 51. See H.R. 1644, 108th Cong. (2001) (enacted); SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶¶ 125–31.  
 52. See generally SMD NPRM supra note 2. The original NPRM proposal sought to complete 
the implementation of SMD by September 30, 2004. 
 53. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 54. Norlander, supra note 41, at 67; SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶ 170. Additionally, the NPRM 
includes a provision that would ban “pancaking”—the addition of new charges by each region of the 
grid for use of the wires in long hauls of power. The removal of pancaking promotes the seamlessness 
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NPRM includes a plan for the creation of Independent Transmission 
Providers (ITPs) that would, among other things, run spot and day-ahead 
energy markets.55 ITPs would be the next evolutionary step in the ISO to 
RTO progression. However, this proposal encountered significant 
opposition.56
The future of SMD is in flux. Some suggest that SMD usurps state 
authority over issues that have historically been regulated at the state and 
local levels.57 Since the issuance of the NPRM, FERC has softened its 
position regarding large organizations to replace RTOs and ISOs.58 It 
shifted to allow already existing RTOs and ISOs to serve an increasing 
role by requiring utilities to join one of these organizations to promote 
homogeneity in the American market.59 But the original proposal for a 
more nationally coordinated market was resurrected by legislation.60 SMD 
was part of the Bush Administration’s energy bill that Congress rejected in 
fall 2003.61 Additionally, the energy bill would require that incumbent 
of the market, which is central to the whole SMD concept. Id. 
 55. SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶¶ 256–325. 
 56. See, e.g., Rulemaking Comment of Ariz. Corp. Comm., F.E.R.C. Docket No. RM01-12-000, 
Feb. 28, 2003; Reply Rulemaking Comment of Ky. Pub. Service Comm., Remedying Undue 
Discrimination through Open Access Transmission Service & Standard Electricity Market Design 
under RM01-12, 10. Some state utility regulators vehemently oppose SMD because they assert that 
local control better provides for any unique qualities within that state. Id. 
 57. Id. See generally Norlander, supra note 41 (noting that it has also been suggested that the 
NPRM goes beyond the delegated power of FERC and that new legislation would be needed to 
implement this plan). See also New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., 535 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002). 
However, the Supreme Court has inched the FERC’s authority closer to an integrated, federal market 
design. It recently held that FERC has control over transmission lines that had heretofore been bundled 
into each state’s regulatory authority. Id. 
 58. The NPRM included the creation of a new entity called an Independent Transmission 
Provider (ITP). They would be larger in geographic scope and scale than either an ISO or a RTO. ITPs 
must be independent and file network access tariffs to cover all the functions within FERC’s 
jurisdiction. 
 59. See generally Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, White Paper: Wholesale Power 
Market Platform (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act 
/smd/white_paper.pdf [hereinafter FERC White Paper]. Interestingly, as FERC reduced the scope of 
the SMD proposal, it also recognized the problems associated with “seams” between markets “where 
differences in design between regions create artificial barriers to trade which raise costs, limit 
customer supply choices, and create opportunities for exploitation.” Id. at 3. But, at the same time, 
FERC stated that it would not change the existing authority of state governments. Id. at 5.  
 60. H.R. 1644, supra note 51. 
 61. H.R. 1644 is sponsored by Joe Barton of Texas and includes many policies strongly 
advocated by the White House, including drilling for oil and gas in the Alaska National Wildlife 
Refuge, subsidies for nuclear and coal power plants, and research into fuel cell technologies. See 
Southern Governors Complain that FERC is Using the Back Door to Implement SMD; Energy Bill’s 
Fate in Limbo as Tauzin’s Resignation Adds Interesting Wrinkle, FOSTER ELECTRIC REPORT, Feb. 11, 
2004, at 3. 
 For a general overview of the SMD components of the Energy Bill, see FERC White Paper, supra 
note 59.  
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utilities get preferential access to the wires in their historic territories.62 
And, like in Europe, the energy bill allows small utilities to “opt-out.”63 
The bill will likely be reconsidered and the SMD debate continues.64 It is 
abundantly clear that the details of any potential final version of SMD 
remain unknown, making planning by market participants difficult. 
II. SHAPING EFFECTIVE RESTRUCTURING POLICY 
Technology has evolved so that generation of electricity no longer 
necessitates natural monopolies.65 Additionally, competition can succeed 
in the retailing of electricity.66 However, this is not the case for the 
transmission and distribution of electricity; these functions remain a 
natural monopoly that should be regulated.67 Therefore, no state or nation 
has deregulated transmission and distribution despite opening its retail and 
generation markets. Yet, robust transmission and distribution systems are 
critical to a successful electricity market, as well as, essential for reliable 
service. 
 The Energy Bill includes a provision that would create “Electric Reliability Organizations” 
(EROs). See H.R. 1644 § 7031. EROs would serve as a unifying organization for the sake of a reliable 
electricity grid and would answer to FERC. Id. Though SMD by definition includes unification and 
homogeneity in the economic aspects of the industry, the ERO proposal acknowledges the 
interconnected nature of the whole system and the need for federal oversight. See also FERC 
Chairman Pat Wood Stresses Electric System Reliability in Discussion of Agency’s 2004 Priorities, 
FOSTER ELECTRIC REPORT, Jan. 14, 2004, at 2. Interestingly, Chairman Wood has stated that FERC 
could go forward with SMD plans even without the explicit blessing of Congress in the Energy Bill. 
Id. 
 62. H.R. 1644, supra note 51, § 7023(a). 
 63. Unlike the EU, the Energy Bill makes the decision to carve out small utilities where the EU 
provides Member States the option to exclude the small utilities from the market. See H.R. 1644, supra 
note 51, § 7021(b)(1). Cf. Directive 2003/54, supra note 20, ¶ 11. 
 64. Demetri Sevastopulo, FERC Chief Intent on Preventing the Lights Going Out Again, FIN. 
TIMES (London, England), Dec. 12, 2003, USA Edition at 2. Congress generally supports the 
electricity elements of the Energy Bill but opposes other sections of it. Oddly, the Energy Bill allows 
implementation of SMD to begin no sooner than 2007. See supra text accompanying note 55. In the 
interim, FERC is pursuing new options for national oversight of reliability that might be allowed under 
current statutes. Id.  
 65. See Joskow & Schmalenese, supra note 33, at 113. See Severin Borenstein, The Trouble With 
Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 195 
n.4 (2002). The New York Mercantile has made several attempts to create an electricity futures market 
but has found that illiquidity and storability issues make electricity fundamentally different from 
commodities like oil. Thus, the market has not succeeded. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Latest RED Index has Texas on Top, with UK Leading All Competitive Markets, 
PLATT’S RETAIL ENERGY, May 10, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter PLATT’S RETAIL ENERGY]. Pennsylvania 
ranked second in the United States behind Texas. Id. 
 67. See Andrew J. Roman, Electricity Deregulation in Canada: An Idea Which has Yet to be 
Tried?, 40 ALBERTA L. REV. 97, 107 (2002). “[T]ransmission and distribution are seen as natural 
monopolies because they are the classical ‘wires’ businesses.” Id. 
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A. English Restructuring 
England and Wales were the first electricity markets to restructure.68 
English and Welsh electricity markets began with a flourish of 
international investment, but in recent years have seen a dramatic decline 
in financial viability and foreign interest.69 The old, regulated model used 
state-owned utilities, unlike the United States. As part of the move to 
competition, the United Kingdom sold its power plants and privatized the 
incumbent retail utilities.70 Though overall the English experience can be 
considered successful,71 like any market, it has not been perfect. 
The English market also uses a single market coordinator, rather than 
one for each region.72 The National Grid Coordinator (NGC) estimates the 
daily supply and demand of electricity for the whole market.73 Then NGC 
runs an auction in which generators bid to provide electricity; the bids are 
stacked lowest to highest, using the least expensive power. The English 
market puts a heavy emphasis on real-time electricity trading, akin to the 
spot market trading of other commodities.74 However, the use of daily 
auctions often leads to volatility and is vulnerable to manipulative 
gaming.75 Because utilities seek to minimize their exposure to risk, a 
hedging market quickly developed and resolved much of this problem.76  
In England there is a single market coordinator; market design and 
oversight are maintained by the national government.77 The English model 
 68. See generally The Electricity Act, 1989, c.29, (U.K.) reprinted in 15 HALSBURY’S STATUTES 
OF ENGLAND & WALES 1607–1771 (4th ed. 1997). Reform in Scotland and Northern Ireland was 
much more modest than in England and Wales. See also EIA Report, supra note 1 and accompanying 
text. The initial divestiture included specific requirements for would-be buyers. In 1995, the 
requirements ended and there was a significant increase in American investment in the U.K. market. 
Id. at 26. 
 69. See DEP’T OF ENERGY: ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UNITED KINGDOM COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
BRIEF, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/uk.html (last modified April 2004) (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2005). 
 70. See EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.  
 71. See, e.g., Platt’s Retail Energy, supra note 66, at 1 (ranking the UK as the best competitive 
electricity market in the world).  
 72. EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See OECD, REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: REGULATORY REFORM IN GAS 
AND ELECTRICITY AND THE PROFESSIONS (Nov. 22, 2002). 
 75. EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. Some have asserted that the bids into the pool 
systematically have not matched marginal cost, suggesting market power problems due to the 
transition from government-controlled monopolies. Id. 
 76. Id. The hedging market depends on contractual relationships between suppliers and retailers. 
Ironically, its roots are derived from the last vestiges of contracts under the regulated model. Id.  
 77. EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. 
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never delegated regulatory authority to local governments, so deregulation 
occurred at the national level. 
Consistent with the single, national market coordinator, the English 
consider the transmission system to be a natural monopoly.78 In fact, NGC 
owns all transmission assets.79 The smaller distribution lines are owned by 
twelve different utilities, but they are regulated by the government.80  
The RECs serve as incumbent retail utilities and compete with new 
retailers. New retail competitors have enjoyed success, especially in 
acquiring large industrial and commercial customers.81  
England’s competitive wholesale market has enjoyed success.82 
However, there have been allegations of market power abuses because 
state-owned generators were split into only three companies.83 This 
consolidation of market power may have contributed to volatile swings in 
prices on the spot market.84  
Like the United States, England recently suffered a significant 
blackout.85 But unlike the United States, the blackout in England can be 
attributed to human error in line repair—a problem independent from the 
system operators.86 However, England and other industrialized nations fear 
additional blackouts because of inadequate infrastructure.87 The laws of 
physics do not change with electricity policy; so, regardless of the 
structure of the industry, a concerted effort to maintain and enhance the 
transmission and distribution infrastructure is essential for reliability. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 8–19. The distribution utilities, also called Regional Electric Companies (RECs), serve 
as incumbent retail utilities in addition to maintaining distribution lines. Id. at 19–20. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Mitchell, supra note 16, at 790–91.  
 83. Id. at 789–90. One of these companies controlled the nuclear power plants. Because of the 
cost structure of nuclear plants vis-à-vis other power plants, they do not typically affect the pricing of 
electricity—leaving the two remaining generation companies with even more market power. 
Fortunately, the introduction of new competitors allays market power. Id. There have been concerns 
that market power may worsen in time because government review of mergers by RECs ceased in 
1995. Id. at 798. 
 84. EIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. 
 85. Julia Finch, Transco to Escape Blackout Penalty, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 1, 2003, at 20. 
 86. Dan Roberts, Separate Faults in Blackout May Be Related, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at 4. 
 87. Dan Roberts, Like a Candle in the Wind, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2003, at 59. 
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B. Norwegian Restructuring 
In 1990, Norway88 passed deregulation legislation opening its 
electricity market to multiple competitors.89 Five years later, the 
Norwegians supplemented their deregulation legislation with laws 
establishing a joint and open wholesale electricity market with Sweden.90 
Generally, the Norwegian deregulation experience has been considered a 
success.  
The Norwegian electricity market has many participants. There are 
about seventy electricity producers and 230 distribution companies in 
Norway’s competitive market.91 Yet, there is only one primary 
transmission owner, Statnett SF, because the Norwegian government 
maintained transmission as a natural monopoly.92
Norway depends heavily on hydroelectric dams for power. Amazingly, 
over ninety-nine percent of Norway’s electricity generation comes from 
hydroelectric sources.93 Because hydroelectricity production depends on 
rainfall, in wet years Norway exports power to Sweden and Finland,94 but 
in dry years it must import electricity from those nations.95 However, few 
new power plants have been constructed in Scandinavia, and there has 
been a string of cold, dry winters. This has led to an increase in demand 
for electricity while the ability of the dams to produce has diminished.96  
 88. Though Norway is not a member of the EU, it provides a useful history of new markets in 
Europe. 
 89. See Aam & Wangensteen, supra note 4. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Helle Grønli, Tomás Gómez San Román & Chris Marnay, Transmission Grid Access and 
Pricing in Norway, Spain and California—A Comparative Study, Presented at Power Delivery Europe 
‘99, Madrid, Spain (Sept. 28–30, 1999). Stattnet owns about seventy-six percent of Norway’s 
transmission lines. Id.  
 93. See Common Position No. 5/2003, supra note 23. 
 94. Kaisa Kinnunen, Electricity Network Regulation—Practical Implementation in the Nordic 
Countries, available at http://wip.tv-berlin.de/workshop/2002/papers/tv-berlin-wip-workshop-2002. 
paper_kinnunen-ELECTRICITY-NETWORK-REGULATION.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). “The 
Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish markets (and in an increasing amount also the Danish) are very much 
integrated through the Scandinavian transmission network organisation, NORDEL, and the Nordic 
Power Exchange, the Nordpool.” Id. 
 95. See Aam & Wangensteen, supra note 4. 
 96. See Charles P. Wallace, Power of the Market: Consumers in the Nordic Region are Furious 
Over Soaring Electricity Prices—and They Blame Deregulation, TIME, Mar. 3, 2003, at 36. From 1999 
to 2001, electricity production in Norway dropped while it increased in Sweden and Finland. See 
European Commission, Competition Indicators in the Electricity Market EU, Norway and Candidate 
Countries 13 (2003), available at http://www.eu-datashop.de/download/EN/inhaltsv/thema8/compind 
.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2005). From 2000 to 2001, only a one year span, imports of electricity into 
Norway grew 628.9%. Id. at 18. 
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Norway and Sweden jointly-own a market operator (Nord Pool) that 
coordinates electricity schedules and assures infrastructural integrity.97 
Nord Pool provides a spot market and financial trading (i.e., futures, 
forwards, and options).98 Additionally, Nord Pool serves as the clearing 
service for bilateral contracts between market participants.99 Nord Pool’s 
comprehensive structure produces a central system for all power trades, 
schedules, and reliability issues. This minimizes the potential for 
communication failures and promotes a sound system. 
C. Restructuring in California 
When California passed its deregulation legislation in 1996, it was the 
first American state to do so.100 Five years later, California suspended 
competition and ended deregulation.101 The first few years of deregulation 
worked well, with only minor glitches.102 However, as was demonstrated 
by highly publicized blackouts, California’s market suffered from fatal 
flaws.103 Many problems contributed to the collapse of the market, 
including generation shortages,104 transmission failures, and market 
manipulation.105
When the market was restructured, the California Independent System 
Operator (CAISO) was established.106 In order to assure that the state 
government, instead of FERC, oversaw CAISO, the California Assembly 
 97. Aam & Wangensteen, supra note 4, at 1. Nord Pool ASA is the only multinational power 
exchange in the world. See Nord Pool’s Legal Status at http://www.nordpool.com (last visited Feb. 20, 
2005). Though Nord Pool is international, regulation of it tends to be dominated by the Norwegian 
government. James Barker, Jr. et al., Regulation of Power Pools and System Operators: An 
International Comparison, 18 ENERGY L.J. 261, 283 (1997). 
 98. Aam & Wangensteen, supra note 4, at 4. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Grønli, supra note 92, at 1. The law opened the markets to competition on Apr. 1, 1998. Id.  
 101. On September 20, 2001, the California Public Utility Commission ordered the end of 
electricity competition in the state. Decision 01-09-060, Sept. 20, 2001. 
 102. Cudahy, supra note 15, at 175. 
 103. California Governor Gray Davis, State of the State address (Jan. 8, 2001), available at 
http://www.video.dot.ca.gov/state/transcript.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). “California’s 
deregulation scheme is a colossal and dangerous failure. It has not lowered consumer prices; it has not 
increased supply. In fact, it has resulted in skyrocketing prices, price-gouging, and an unreliable 
supply of electricity. In short, an energy nightmare.” Amusingly, Governor Davis pointed the finger of 
blame at “out of state profiteers,” instead of errant policymaking. Id. 
 104. See Timothy J. Considine & Andrew N. Kleit, Comparing Electricity Deregulation in 
California and Pennsylvania: Implications for the Appalachian Region, Jan. 15, 2002, at 59, at 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/c/p/cpw/resume/ARCFinalReportJanuaryRevision.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2003). 
 105. Timothy P. Duane, Regulations Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 
YALE J. REG. 471, 511 (2002). 
 106. Id. at 498. 
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created the Electricity Oversight Board.107 But neither CAISO nor the 
Electricity Oversight Board could require transmission projects.108 “The 
utilities would still own and maintain the transmission systems under 
[CAISO] oversight and be responsible to assure that electricity was 
distributed to businesses and homes, however, in order to receive their 
[stranded costs] they had to submit control of their transmission systems to 
[CAISO].”109  
Trading of electricity occurred outside of CAISO in the California 
Power Exchange (Cal PX). California deregulation law required that all 
electricity trades occur in a spot market in what is called a pool system.110 
No futures or options contracts were permitted, meaning that the price of 
electricity in California could not be hedged, even if the parties involved 
in the trade wanted the added security.111 In the early years of the market, 
the repercussions of this design were minimal as there was little volatility 
in supply or in prices.112 However, this peacefulness ended in the late 
nineties.113
 107. Cudahy, supra note 15, at 176–77. This did not solve the problem of multiple regulators 
going down divergent policy paths. In the early stages of the energy crisis, FERC (under pressure from 
the White House) refused to cap the price of wholesale electricity in California. Presumably, this was 
with the belief that supply and demand would eventually find equilibrium without the aid of 
government. On the flip side, the Californian regulators would not allow utilities to flow the added 
costs to consumers’ bills. This blocked the price signals that would have led to equilibrium. The 
counteracting federal and state policies led to the financial collapse of the Californian electricity 
industry. Id. 
 108. CAISO can, however, propose transmission projects and encourage transmission owners to 
build new needed power lines. Id. See Nicholas W. Fels & Frank R. Lindh, Lessons from the 
California “Apocalypse”: Jurisdiction Over Electric Utilities, 22 ENERGY L.J. 1, 38 (2001). 
Jurisdiction over different elements of the market proved to be quite a source of question. For 
example, in December 1998 a major transmission line in northern California failed. It caused two 
power plants in California to trip offline and a blackout that affected the majority of the San Francisco 
Bay area for about six hours. The California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) initiated an 
investigation, which it never finished. But in actuality, the CPUC had no jurisdiction over the issue; it 
was federal. The CPUC did not realize this jurisdictional problem. Id. 
 109. Alan Ramo, California’s Energy Crisis—The Perils of Crisis Management and a Challenge 
to Environmental Justice, 7 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1, 4 (2002). 
 110. See Fels & Lindh, supra note 108, at 1 (“California encouraged investor-owned utilities to 
sell off their generation plants and compelled them to buy all of the power needed to supply their 
customers in a newly created spot market.”). “In an electricity pool, all producers sell their power into 
a centrally operated electricity pool, and all customers (or their retail providers) purchase from the 
pool. The pool market is run by an independent system operator that also controls the physical 
structure of the electricity grid and thus moves power to where it is demanded and adjusts prices to 
reflect the supply/demand balance at each point on the grid.” Borenstein, supra note 65, at 194. 
 111. See Cudahy, supra note 15, at 174. Eventually, toward the end of the crisis, the Californian 
market began to allow bilateral contracts. Many assert that this simple change was one of the most 
important remedies to the gaming and manipulation of the market. Id. at 179. In fact, some economists 
assert that the most efficient market would include the option for market participants to enter a mixture 
of long term contracts and short-term/spot markets. See, e.g., Borenstein, supra note 65, at 192. 
 112. William H. Hieronymus, J. Stephen Henderson & Carolyn A. Berry, Market Power Analysis 
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Because of limited energy generation in California and the inability to 
import adequate energy, market power became a severe problem in 2000–
2001.114 California had grown dependent on electricity imports from the 
Northwest.115 During 2000–2001, Californian’s demand continued to 
increase while hydroelectric production in the Northwest dropped due to 
drought.116 California’s transmission infrastructure proved inadequate 
during this time as well. Moreover, the demand for electricity in 
neighboring states grew, causing any excess supply that had once gone to 
California to remain in places like Nevada.117
Many believe that market power was severely concentrated in the 
California market and that this led to higher prices as well as scarcer 
supplies. Paul Joskow, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, argues that the number of power plants taken off-line in 
California when demand for electricity was high, suggests a failure of the 
competitive market.118 This contention coincides with the California 
Public Utility Commission’s finding that fourteen of the sixteen hours of 
blackout that occurred in southern California during the energy crisis 
could have been avoided if five companies (Reliant, AES/Williams, 
Dynegy, Duke, and Mirant) had utilized available capacity on a timely 
basis.119 “[I]t is increasingly clear that there was at least some illegal 
withholding of power from the market to drive up price.”120 In fact, 
localized market power resulted from failures in grid management and the 
inability of many users to utilize their open access rights to the grid.121 
of the Electricity Generation Sector, 23 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6 (2002). 
 113. See Jonathan Peterson, Energy Remains a Litmus Test on Davis as Manager; The Governor’s 
Actions as the Electricity Debacle Unfolded Come Under Scrutiny Again as He Fights for Political 
Survival, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at C1. Most utilities had fixed retail prices while the wholesale 
prices of electricity surged. This led to the financial devastation of many companies and the 
bankruptcy of the largest utility in the San Francisco Bay area, Pacific Gas & Electric. Id. The 
wholesale price of electricity increased ten-fold from December 1999 to December 2000. Hieronymus, 
supra note 112, at 1. 
 114. Duane, supra note 105, at 509–15.  
 115. Id. at 508. The Northwest experienced several rainy years in the late 1990s, so there was an 
abundance of cheap hydroelectric electricity available to California. Id. 
 116. Id. at 509. 
 117. William A. Mogel, U.S. Electric Restructuring: A Lesson for Canada, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 339, 
341 (2002). 
 118. See CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, REPORT ON WHOLESALE ELECTRIC 
GENERATION INVESTIGATION 45 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Published/ 
Report/19417.htm (citing Joskow’s findings that strategic withholding of plant capacity at least 
partially fueled the California Energy crisis) (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). 
 119. Peter Navarro & Michael Shames, Electricity Deregulation: Lessons Learned from 
California, 24 ENERGY L.J. 33, 37 (2003). 
 120. Id. at 59. 
 121. Id. at 39. 
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Geographic proximity of power plants to consumers became essential as 
confidence in the opportunity to utilize the grid diminished.122  
D. Restructuring in Pennsylvania 
Shortly after California passed its deregulation law; Pennsylvania 
followed suit.123 Like California, Pennsylvania allowed customers to 
choose which retail company provided their electricity.124 Pennsylvania’s 
legislation also included a guaranteed eight percent discount for the 
incumbents’ residential customers.125 Unlike California, the Pennsylvania 
market has succeeded.126  
However, competition has been more successful in eastern 
Pennsylvania than in western parts of the state.127 Some attribute this 
regional disparity to the existence of an established ISO in the east but not 
in the west.128 Substantial infrastructure and established market rules 
promote competition. 
The Pennsylvania model allows the use of bilateral contracts, similar to 
those that evolved in the English market, while maintaining a spot market 
for real-time transactions.129 The schedules that result from the bilateral 
contracts are submitted directly to PJM to assure that there is adequate 
capacity on the power lines and to assure reliable delivery of the power.130 
 122. Id. 
 123. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2802(13) (West 1979 & Supp. 1998). 
 124. Id. See also ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, TRENDS IN PENNSYLVANIA’S 
ELECTRICITY RETAIL PRICES FACT SHEET, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/fact_ 
sheets/pennsylvania.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). 
 125. Id. For comparison, California included a ten percent residential discount in its deregulation 
legislation. Id. See also Duane, supra note 114, at 501. 
 126. See, e.g., Latest RED Index has Texas on Top, with UK Leading All Competitive Markets, 
PLATTS’ RETAIL ENERGY, May 10, 2002, at 1 (ranking Pennsylvania the second best competitive retail 
electricity market in the United States). See also Lynne Kiesling, Keep California Energy Crisis in 
Perspective: The Feds Understand that Energy Deregulation Works Well If Done Right, ORANGE 
COUNTY REGISTER, Dec. 6, 2002 (as of the end of 2002, Pennsylvania residential customers saved 
about four billion dollars with six years of competition instead of regulation). 
 127. CITIZENS ACTION COALITION EDUCATION FUND, ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING FOR A 
COMPETITIVE TOMORROW: HOW THE PENDING CHANGES IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY WILL 
AFFECT INDIANA’S RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS (1999), at http://www.citact.org/ctomorr.html (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2005). 
 128. Id. Only a small part of western Pennsylvania is outside of PJM. See PJM Control Area Map, 
at http://www.pjm.com/about/territory-served.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). There may be other 
factors affecting the level of competition, such as urbanization and potential for profits. 
 129. Considine & Kleit supra note 104, at 58. 
 130. The Pennsylvania system has an integrated transmission system and energy market, unlike 
the old California model. This aids in communication (and thus reliability), plus it reduces 
opportunities for market manipulation. See Michael A. Yuffee, California’s Electricity Crisis: How 
Best to Respond to the “Perfect Storm,” 22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 87 (citing William Hogan’s 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p675 Kimbrough book pages.doc 11/8/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
692 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:675 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, PJM provides a spot market, thus giving market participants 
a choice in the creation of their energy portfolios.131
Pennsylvania’s ISO and PJM have been actively seeking to create a 
single market with the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO).132 
The combined PJM/MISO entity would cover much of the American 
Midwest and would, coincidentally, move closer to the design proposed in 
SMD.  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Comparing European Electricity Homogenization Efforts to America’s 
Current Proposals 
European attempts to create a homogenous market have been 
inadequate because the EU has been either unwilling or unable to create 
strong Union-wide mandates for common policy.133 The ongoing freedom 
of the Member States to create their own tariffs and to use their own 
methodologies,134 inevitably means that heterogeneous markets will 
prevail. Moreover, the exemptions for small utilities exacerbate the lack of 
uniformity across Europe. The biggest threat to a seamless electricity 
market in Europe rests in the Member States themselves.135 A seamless, 
recommendation that California’s market would benefit from the implementation of policies adopted 
in Pennsylvania). 
 131. See Norlander, supra note 41, at 67. This is an identical system to that FERC’s NPRM 
proposes to implement throughout the United States. Id. 
 132. F.E.R.C. Docket No. EL02-65-000, Implementation Progress Report, filed Oct. 1, 2003. 
MISO is now working with PJM to create a robust, non-discriminatory single energy market covering 
their collective regions. Id.  
 133. See Council Directive supra note 3; Common Position, supra note 3; Council Directive 
2003/54/EC, supra note 20. Each of these Directives allows Member States to exclude local utilities 
from the larger market based on their own internal assessment. This is not a problem in either the 
English or the Norwegian systems. A single market has been established that includes all of the 
reasonably connected parties in both nations, i.e., it would be impractical to try to connect England to 
Belgium with an underwater transmission system. However the infrastructure between nations that 
could be part of a common system cannot support the market. See “Green Paper,” supra note 33, at 15. 
The larger nations in the European Union have recognized the need for stronger centralized EU 
policymaking power to steer various industries. Nick Antonovics, “Big 3” Want EU Commission 
Revamp, REUTERS UK, Feb. 16, 2003. 
 134. See supra note 15. 
 135. See generally Mitchell, supra note 16. Some suggest that the Europeans should promote 
regional cooperation as a second-best option because of the loggerheads created by infighting on the 
Union-wide market. See Coen & Doyle, supra note 14, at 25. This has an uncanny resemblance to the 
current environment in the United States. SMD has shifted from a policy placing the highest priority 
on a national system to increasingly becoming a policy of regionalism. See supra notes 37–41 and 
accompanying text. 
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homogeneous market is best achieved by consolidation of rule creation 
and enforcement under a single European regulator.136  
The United States should learn from the EU’s continued failure to 
create a seamless market and take a much stronger stance in favor of a 
unified market than the EU.137 Though, like the EU, the United States has 
a long tradition of state regulation and local oversight, the evolution to 
competitive, intra-state markets diminishes the relevance of state scrutiny 
and, therefore, should diminish their authority.138 All power lines capable 
of carrying interstate electricity or affecting the interstate transmission of 
electricity should be strictly within the domain of FERC.139  
 136. See OECD, supra note 13, at 16 (suggesting that the EU’s lack of authority to compel a 
unified market and its dependence upon the wishes of the local governments from whom it seeks to 
gain permission explain the lack of homogeneity and a strict set of measures for a unified market). Id. 
The United States should not face the same problem. The delegation of regulatory power to the states 
comes from the federal government in the Federal Power Act. “The Commission [FERC] shall have 
jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy, but shall not have 
jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local 
distribution . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). There is no compelling reason that Congress could not reverse 
the delegation of power that it provided. In fact, before the Federal Power Act was enacted, the 
Supreme Court treated electricity like other goods and used the “touch and concern” analysis of the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. 
Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927). 
 137. Even more than the European Union, the United States has a tradition of unified federal 
decision-making on issues of interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In this vein, 
FERC’s jurisdiction over quasi-governmental entities (i.e., Tennessee Valley Authority, Bonneville 
Power Authority, etc.) is limited in comparison to its oversight of other market participants. See, e.g., 
Umatilla Electric Cooperative Assoc., 97 FERC 61, 235 (2001) (utilizing the option for quasi-
governmental and cooperative utilities to enter the competitive market by creating an acceptable 
reciprocity tariff). This is in stark contrast to the Norwegian system where government ownership does 
not preclude regulatory oversight. See OECD, supra note 13, at 30. 
 138. The United States has a clear advantage over the European Union in this respect. FERC has 
been a common, federal regulator of certain elements of the industry for quite some time, while the 
European Union does not have a comparable regulator. See supra note 35, art. 23 (Member States in 
the EU still designate their own registry authorities; no “federal” FERC equivalent). 
 139. State utility commissions could retain customer protection and retail market oversight 
functions, but there should be no wholesale market oversight or infrastructure reliability duties for the 
state utility commissions. This should easily survive Constitutional concerns as well. Justice Douglas, 
dissenting in a case adding to FERC authority under old federal energy statutes, claimed that he had 
“no doubt that Congress has constitutional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause the interstate 
‘commingling’ of electric power.” Fed. Power Comm. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 
469–70 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 Application of the Commerce Clause supports a single federal regulator because the U.S. 
electricity grid connects forty-seven states as well as large sections of Canada (Alaska, Hawaii, and 
Texas have their own grids). Clearly, the intrastate activity in any of the forty-seven interconnected 
states “touches and concerns” each other as well as Canada.  
 An analogy also can be made to Madison’s Federalist No. 10. Madison contended that a strong 
federal government instead of strong state governments would reduce the power of the few at the 
expense of the many. “[T]he most common and durable source of factions has been the various and 
unequal distribution of property. . . . The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct 
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will 
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Uncertainty feeds risk, which reduces the likelihood that utilities will 
invest in electricity infrastructure. This poses an especially disconcerting 
problem when investment in transmission and distribution lines drops as a 
result. Without the ability to ship power there could be a ripple effect of 
discouraging investment in power plants; plus, the obvious inability to get 
sufficient electricity to consumers. The opt-out provisions of the EU 
Directives140 create uncertainty making utility investment plans more 
difficult than they need be. American uncertainty about SMD could pose 
the same problem.141 There is both the uncertainty of whether it will come 
to fruition142 in any form, as well as uncertainty of what the final design 
will include.143 Moreover, there is uncertainty about the treatment of 
quasi-governmental utilities.144 American policymakers should learn from 
the European experience of the past ten years and make a well-defined and 
cohesive decision on the issue.145  
a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a 
majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert 
and execute their plans of oppression.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). Here, the concern 
would be that the strong incumbent utilities would have the power to oppress newer, smaller market 
entrants both economically and politically. A larger, more interstate market should mitigate the market 
power harms that have harmed markets like California.  
 140. See supra notes 27, 36 and accompanying text. 
 141. Hopefully, the opt-out clause in the NPRM will not pose a problem. In addition to the 
uncertainty regarding SMD generally and the impasse on the NPRM, the opt-out clause in the NPRM 
would require permission from FERC itself—not a local regulator. See SMD NPRM, supra note 2, 
¶ 115. 
 142. Many have concerns about a single market, even in philosophy. See, e.g., Rulemaking 
Comment of Ariz. Corp. Comm. et al., supra note 56. 
 143. There are significant differences between the SMD NPRM and the version currently pending 
in Congress. See supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 144. Current regulations and law allow quasi-governmental utilities to choose whether to 
participate in the competitive market, and this choice can be changed by the utility at anytime. See 
Emerald Util. Dist. v. Bonneville Power Admin., supra note 47. It seems peculiar to continue to allow 
this option in a single market setting because it would in essence mean that the “single market” could 
become multiple markets if a quasi-governmental utility so chose. This could lead to the same 
uncertainty that resulted from the European opt-out provisions. 
 Though in a more general context, FERC has made the same finding that “[h]aving two or more 
different sets of rules governing the operation of a transmission system makes it difficult—if not at 
times impossible—for that system to support an efficient regional electric power market.” SMD 
NPRM, supra note 2, ¶ 62. 
 145. While the evidence and basic economic theory suggest that larger markets would promote 
efficiency, a choice to simply revert to isolated state utilities would be better than lingering uncertainty 
because it would allow market participants to adjust their investments and strategies to something 
concrete. Cf. SMD NPRM, supra note 2, ¶ 26 (saying that uncertainty about policy details harmed the 
growth of RTOs). 
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B. Comparing English and Norwegian Restructuring to American 
Restructuring 
Because England and Norway developed their competitive electricity 
markets before any American state, some aspects of those markets were 
borrowed by America. However, none of these markets exactly mimic 
each other and the results differ dramatically as well. The reluctance of 
nations to deregulate has put the electricity market in a state of limbo, in 
that uncertainty deters investment in infrastructure, thus harming 
reliability and the ability to ship cleaner and less expensive electricity on 
demand.146 This poses an even greater concern in the United States than in 
England because American utilities already spend less on transmission 
lines than their English counterparts.147
1. Comparing California to Europe 
California’s deregulation fiasco made many aware of electricity 
restructuring for the first time—perhaps not the best way to start the 
education process. Oddly, the California experiment consciously borrowed 
market design elements from the already existing and successful English 
system. Specifically, California implemented a spot market in which 
nearly all electricity was to be traded.148 However, unlike England, 
California mandated the use of the spot market, limiting potential 
development of bilateral relationships.149 Many have suggested that the 
wild price volatility of the California market would have quelled—or 
never occurred—had a contract system using bilateral relationships been 
 146. Roberts, supra note 87, at 59. 
 147. David Firn & Dan Roberts, U.S. Spends Little More on Grid than UK, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Aug. 18, 2003, at 5. The United States is fifteen times the size of England but the investments are 
comparable. Id. Some suggest that the American system does not provide sufficient profit incentives 
for investments in transmission. Id. The North American Reliability Council reports “that only 6,588 
miles of new transmission” are expected to be constructed in “North America in the next 10 years.” 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Bringing the Camel into the Tent: State and Federal Power Over 
Electricity Transmission, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001). 
 148. Fels & Lindh, supra note 108, at 1. 
 149. In a bit of irony, the crisis in the California market compelled it to try to adopt one of the 
elements of the English market that it originally ignored—unified ownership of transmission facilities. 
In order to aid the local utilities as they sorted through their economic morass, the California 
government offered to buy the transmission lines of all the investor-owned utilities. Southern 
California Edison accepted the offer but Pacific Gas & Electric could not because it was barred by its 
bankruptcy proceeding. See Cudahy, supra note 15, at 179. The CAISO did not own any transmission 
facilities. See Alexandra I. Metzner, Were California’s Electricity Price Shocks Nothing More than a 
New Form of Stranded Costs?, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 535, 554 n.101 (2002). Cf. EIA REPORT, supra note 
1 (England’s transmission system is owned by the NGC).  
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permitted to develop.150 The English bilateral market naturally evolved 
from the market participants’ desire to hedge risk, and government never 
intruded with obtrusive mandates. American states that are continuing to 
consider deregulation151 should not impair the ability of secondary 
markets, like the English bilateral markets, to evolve naturally. 
The Californian system included a morass of regulatory agencies, both 
at the state and the federal level.152 Not only were there conflicts over 
jurisdiction, but there were also conflicts on direction and philosophy.153 
In contrast, the English system operates under one set of national 
regulations. The English counties do seek to impose their own regulations; 
markets reward those who regulate efficiently. 
California grew heavily dependent upon imports of hydro-electricity 
and, like Norway, suffered shortages when droughts occurred.154 
Policymakers in California made power plant construction exceedingly 
difficult for environmental reasons in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Likewise, the Norwegian government strongly opposed non-hydro sources 
of electricity and actually closed its nuclear power plant. The combination 
of these factors has led to similar results in Norway and California, though 
admittedly of different magnitudes. Norway and California both 
experienced price increases as the supply of electricity available to their 
markets dropped, and both encountered exceedingly low supply margins 
that threatened reliability.155 But, imports pose the key difference between 
the markets. California found imports from neighboring states difficult to 
acquire because of infrastructural limits; the wire simply could not get 
enough power into the state.156 Norway has been able to import substantial 
amounts of electricity from Sweden and Finland,157 which mutes the 
impact of domestic shortfalls. 
 150. See supra note 111. 
 151. This number has dropped quite dramatically in the wake of the California disaster. See, e.g., 
Jean C. Moore, Evidence-At-Issue Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Public Service Co. of New 
Mexico v. Lyons: A Party Must Use Privileged Materials Offensively in Order to Waive the Privilege, 
31 N.M. L. REV. 623, 623 n.8 (2001) (explaining that New Mexico delayed deregulation from 2002 to 
2007 after the crisis).  
 152. For example, the California Public Utility Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the California Governor’s Office, the California Energy Commission, and others all tried 
to dictate policy for the market. 
 153. See, e.g., Cudahy, supra note 15, at 156. 
 154. See supra notes 93 and 94 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra notes 95, 96, and 104 and accompanying text. 
 156. See New Release, supra note 120. 
 157. See supra note 95. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/15
p675 Kimbrough book pages.doc 11/8/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY POLICY A GUIDE TO AMERICA 697 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly, unlike England and Norway, California’s electricity scheduling 
entity, the CAISO, did not have a market place for spot, futures, or options 
trading. Instead, the vast majority of trading flowed through a separate 
entity called the California Power Exchange.158  
2. Comparing Pennsylvania to Europe 
Pennsylvania’s market has been a shining star for proponents of 
electricity deregulation in the United States,159 and its structure has much 
in common with the English and Norwegian markets. Though, like 
California, there is a mix of state and federal regulation, the policies 
produced by each do not conflict with one another. Also, Pennsylvania 
only has one agency (the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission) to 
determine intrastate electricity policy, as compared to the California 
system of multiple regulatory agencies.  
Pennsylvania’s market is consciously seeking to reduce barriers 
between it and other regions of the United States. For example, PJM is 
currently negotiating to reduce trade barriers with MISO, the market to its 
west.160 This process parallels the market expansion that Norway 
implemented with Sweden and later Finland.161 Norway’s interconnection 
with neighboring nations has proven invaluable in providing reliable 
electricity to its consumers.162 Broad and unencumbered interconnection of 
 158. Cudahy, supra note 15, at 174. There were a handful of smaller power exchanges that 
worked in competition with the Cal PX. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and 
Ancillary Services into Markets Operated by the Cal. Ind. Syst. Oper. and the Cal. Power Exchange, 
105 FERC ¶ 61,066, 61,159–61,172 (Oct. 16, 2003) (outlining the behavior and the responsibilities of 
one these smaller power exchanges called APX). 
 159. See, e.g., Latest RED Index has Texas on Top, with UK Leading all Competitive Markets, 
PLATT’S RETAIL ENERGY, May 10, 2002, at 1. Pennsylvania ranked as the second-best competitive 
market in the United States. Id.  
 160. See F.E.R.C. Docket No. EL02-65-000, supra note 132. 
 161. See Aam & Wangensteen, supra note 4. The consolidation of regulatory power in a single 
entity among the Scandinavians provides an important lesson as Pennsylvania’s market becomes more 
integrated with other states. See supra note 50. While it seems unlikely that one state will acquiesce to 
another like the Scandinavians did, the efficiency of a single regulator makes a compelling reason for 
added coordination and/or SMD.  
 162. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, NORWAY COUNTY ANALYSIS BRIEF, at 
http://www.ein.doc.gov/eneu/cabs/norway.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2005). Engineering limitations 
can have the same impact as political ones. For example, inadequate infrastructure can frustrate efforts 
to ship more efficient power from one market to another just as much as a regulatory prohibition. See 
supra note 32 (2% shipping from France to Spain). The United States also suffers from this problem. 
Many regions of the United States that would otherwise export electricity cannot because of structural 
limitations. See Robert T. Eynon et al., The Electric Transmission Network: A Multi-Region Analysis, 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/transmiss. 
html. See also supra note 147 (comparing U.S. investment on infrastructure to the U.K.). 
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markets assures that those who can best provide electricity will be able to 
provide for those who need the electricity the most.163  
3. General Lessons for Deregulating Electricity Markets 
If it comes to fruition, a single market would include a single design for 
wholesale markets. Consequently, a national system should be shaped by 
the comparison of various states’ experiences as well as those abroad. 
England, Norway, California, and Pennsylvania highlight the 
fundamentals essential to a functional national market. First, there must be 
adequate infrastructure to haul the electricity.164 Second, there must be 
sufficient market liquidity to prevent gaming. And perhaps most 
importantly, third, the market should be flexible to allow participants to 
shape deals that can efficiently meet their needs.165 All of this should be 
combined with the central goal of achieving a seamless national market 
where efficiency is rewarded with access to eager customers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The American and European restructuring experiences have much in 
common, suggesting a universal maxim for electricity markets: the simpler 
and bigger the market, the better the market. Government policies that 
create peculiar “opt-out” clauses for specific market participants only 
complicate the market to the detriment of the whole. Moreover, successful 
markets need simple and efficient means by which to deliver their goods, 
 163. This is not to suggest that regulators do not have a place in the transition to competition—far 
from it. Market monitoring is crucial to assure that market power abuse and gaming do not occur. 
Unencumbered, here, means that regional borders should not limit otherwise rational market decisions. 
This is consistent with scholarly recommendations for ongoing oversight of the European market. See 
Coen & Doyle, supra note 14, at 22 (“Although competition lies at the heart of liberalization measures, 
regulation is required in part to overcome obstacles standing in its path so that benefits materialize.”). 
It is also consistent with current activity at FERC in the United States. See F.E.R.C. FY 2005 
Congressional Performance Budget Request, at 6, available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/strat-
docs/FY05-Budg.pdf. In August of 2002, FERC created the Office of Market Oversight and 
Investigations (OMOI) to:  
Assess market performance, ensure conformance with Commission rules, and report on its 
findings to the Commission and the public. OMOI also analyzes overall energy markets to 
identify and remedy key issues before they become major problems, and serves as the ‘cop on 
the beat’ to ensure that individual market players play by the rules. 
Id. 
 164. For California see supra note 120; for Spain/France see supra note 33. 
 165. California refused to allow a bilateral market to reduce risk. On the other hand, England 
allowed the market participants to create a needed element for the market. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/15
p675 Kimbrough book pages.doc 11/8/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY POLICY A GUIDE TO AMERICA 699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and policies that impair transport and mutually agreeable transactions also 
impair the market. 
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